42 8 Obje&ions to the imtnateriality

from which the objections above are drawn:so there are not wanting others which springfrom the active nature of the soul, and asclearly strew that part of our composition.I do not mean life and spontaneous action,nor thought and reason, which are constantand obvious appearances, utterly incompe-tent to material substance; but Other phæno-mena less observed; one or two of which Ibeg leave here barely to name. One altoge-ther inconsistent with the materiality of thatthing which thinks in us, is, that we aresometimes so wholly occupied in the contem-plation of some absent object, or some pure-ly ideal thing, that we are quite impercipientof objects round us, and which at presentact upon our senses (o). Certainly a present

(s) <c Sometimes (fays Mr. Locke b. 2. ch. ig. seel." 3.) the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness" on the contemplation of some objects, that it turns“ their ideas on all sides; remarks their relations and“ circumstances; and views every part so nicely, and44 with such intention, that it struts out all other thoughts,“ and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made“ then on the senses, which at another season would“ produce very sensible perceptions.” It were to bewsthed that the Author had applied this to the possibi"lity of matter’s thinking.