of the soul considered. 429

objeSi should more powerfully solicit a mate-rial percipient, by its constant and real action,than things distant in time and place, whichdo not act at all, or than abjlra ff ideal cbjeBs^which cannot act. I need not give examplesof such as are in grief, anger, fear, love;every one will remember such instances, ei-ther in himself or others, as are altogetherunaccountable, if the percipient within uswere material. A man may sit in a fullcompany at table, and neither hear nor feewhat is done round him. And a disorder ofthe body cannot so much as be pretendedhere. It happens entirely from the simpli-city of the attention, or perceptive faculty,which cannot apply intensely to more thingsat once {p ); and from its voluntarilyemploy-ing itself in the earnest consideration of some-thing absent, whereby it becomes impercipi-

(p) Lucretius is very explicit in asserting this simpli-city of the perceptive faculty, when it serves his turn;though it be altogether inconsistent with his principles.Ettamen , in rebus quoque apertis, nofcere posts,

Si non advert as animum, perinde ejfe quafs omniTempore femotœ fuerint, longeque remotes.

Cur igitur nurum ef, animus ft ecstera perdit ,Prœterquam quibus ef in rebus deditus ipfe?

Lib. 4, ver. 899.

ent

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