GENERAL EIVELL AT BULL RUN.
259
Two letters, from General Lee and Mr. Walker, Secretary of War, are citedas evidence that General Beauregard commanded. Those gentlemen werenot in a position to know if I relinquished the command. But I had thisletter from General Lee :
“ Richmond, July 24tli, 1861. My Dear General : I almost wept for joy at the glorious victoryachieved by our brave troops. The feelings of my heart could hardly be repressed on learningthe brilliant share you had in its achievement. I expected nothing else, and am truly gratefulfor your safety. . . .”
In conclusion, I cannot discover that my unfavorable opinion of the Fed-eral general’s tactics, quoted by General Beauregard, indicates a fear tocommand against him.
GENERAL EWELL AT BULL RUN. j
BY MAJOR CAMPBELL BROWN, AIDE-DE-CAMP AND ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO GENERAL EWELL.
In General Beauregard’s article on Bull Run, in“The Century” for November [1884], is thissevere criticism of one of his subordinates, thelate Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell :
“ Meanwhile, in rear of Mitchell’s Ford, I had beenwaiting with General Johnston for the sound of conflictto open in the quarter of Centreville upon the Federalleft flank and rear (making allowance, however, for thedelays possible to commands unused to battle), when Iwas chagrined to hear from General X>. R. Jones that,while he had been long ready for the movement uponCentreville, General Ewell had not come up to form onhis right, though he had sent him between 7 and 8 o’clocka copy of his own order, which recited that Ewell hadbeen already ordered to begin the movement. I dis-patched an immediate order to Ewell to advance; butwithin a quarter of an hour, just as I received a dispatchfrom him informing me that he had received no order toadvance in. the morning, the firing on the left began toincrease so intensely as to indicate a severe attack,whereupon General Johnston said that he would gopersonally to that quarter.”
j This article appeared substantially as here printed in“The Century ” for March, 1885.— Editors.
| [correspondence.]
Union Mills, July 25th, 1861.
General Beauregard.
Sir: Iu a conversation with Major James, Louisiana6th Regiment, he has left the impression on my mindthat you think some of your orders on the 21st wereeither not carried out or not received by me.
My first order on that day was to hold myself in readi-ness to attack — this at sunrise. About 10, General Jonessent a copy of an order received by him in which it wasstated that T had been ordered to cross and attack, andon receipt of this I moved on until receiving the fol-lowin S : 10 & 1-2 A. M.
On account of the difficulties of the ground in our front, itis thought advisable to fall back to our former position.
This contains at least three errors, so seriousthat they should not be allowed to pass uncor-rected among the materials from which historywill one day be constructed:
1. That Ewell failed to do what a good soldierwould have done—namely, to move forward im-mediately on hearing from D. R. Jones.
2. That Beauregard was made aware of this sup-posed backwardness of Ewell by a message fromD. R. Jones.
3. That on receiving this message he at onceordered Ewell to advance.
The subjoined correspondence, 4- now [March,1885] first in print, took place four days afterthe battle. It shows that Ewell did exactly whatBeauregard says he ought to have done — namely,move forward promptly; that his own staff-officer,sent to report this forward movement, carried alsoto headquarters the first intelligence of the failure
If any other order was sent to me, I should like to havea copy of it, as well as the name of the courier whobrought it.
Every movement I made was at once reported to youat the time, and this across Bull Run, as well as theadvance in the afternoon, I thought were explained inmy report sent in to-day.
If an order were sent earlier than the copy throughGeneral Jones, the courier should be held responsible,as neither General Holmes nor myself received it. Isend the original of the order to fall back in the morn-ing. The second advance in the afternoon and recall toStone Bridge were in consequence of verbal orders.
My chief object in writing to you is to ask you to leavenothing doubtful in your report, both as regards mycrossing in the morning and recall—and not to let it beinferred by any possibility that I blundered on that day.I moved forward as soon as notified by General Jonesthat I was ordered and he had been.