approaching this in magnitude had ever beforebeen confided to any officer of the United States .
Everywhere the armies remained inactive. Forseven months the Army of the Potomac was heldwithin the defenses of Washington . Its only im-portant movement had resulted in the dishearten-ing disaster of Ball’s Bluff. The Confederates,with headquarters at Manassas , confronted themwith an army, represented by General McClellan ,on the faith of his secret-service department, asnumbering at least 115,500, probably 150,000,but now known to have at no time exceeded63,000. j The Potomac was closed to naviga-tion by Confederate batteries established on itsbanks within twenty-three miles of the capital.Norfolk , with its navy-yard, was left untouchedand unmenaced. The loyal States had furnishedthree-quarters of a million of soldiers, and thecountry had rolled up a daily increasing war debtof $600,000,000. There is no indication thatGeneral McClellan appreciated, or even perceived,the consequences that must inevitably follow theloss of confidence on the part of the people, asmonth after month passed without action andwithout success in any quarter, or the positionin which, under these circumstances, he placedthe President, with respect to the continued sup-port of the people and and their representatives,by withholding full information of his plans. Inhis “ Own Story ” he tells how he refused to givethis information when called upon by the Presi-dent in the presence of his Cabinet.
The President having, on the 31st of January,ordered the movement of all the disposable forceof the Army of the Potomac, for the purpose ofseizing a point on the railroad beyond ManassasJunction, General McClellan on the same day sub-mitted his own plan for moving on Richmond byway of Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock. Onthe 8th of March, yielding to General McClellan ’sviews, supported by the majority of his divisioncommanders, the President approved the Urbanamovement, with certain conditions ; but on the 9ththe Confederates evacuated Manassas , and thusrendered the whole plan inoperative. On the 13th,upon General McClellan ’s recommendation, sup-ported by the commanders of all four of the newlyconstituted army corps, the President authorizedthe movement by Fort Monroe, as it was finallymade.
McClellan expected to take with him to the Pen-insula 146,000 men of all arms, to be increased to156,000 by a division to be drawn from Fort Mon-roe. On the 31st of March, the President informedhim that he had been obliged to order Blenker’sdivision of about 10,000 men, J with 18 guns, toFremont. “I did this with great pain,” he says,“ knowing that you would wish it otherwise. Ifyou could know the full pressure of the case, I amconfident you would approve.”
The council of corps commanders had annexedto their approval, among other conditions, the fol-lowing: “Fourth, that the force to be left to
cover Washington shall be such as to give anentire feeling of security for its safety from men-ace. . . . Note. —That wdth the forts on the
right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned andthose on the left bank occupied, a covering force infront of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would |suffice (Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell). Atotal of 40,000 men for the defense of the citywould suffice. (Sumner.)” Upon this point thePresident’s orders were: “1st. Leave such aforce at Manassas Junction as shall make it en- jtirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess :himself of that position and line of communica-tion. 2d. Leave Washington secure.”
On the 1st of April, as he was on the point ofsailing, General McClellan reported from his head-quarters on board the steamer Commodore, the ar-rangements he had made to carry out these provi-sions, and at once set out for Fort Monroe withoutknowing whether they were satisfactory to theGovernment or not. They were not. General Mc-Clellan had arranged to leave 7780 men at War-renton, 10,859 at Manassas , 1350 on the LowerPotomac, and 18,000 men for the garrisons and Ithe front of Washington , to be augmented byabout 4000 new troops from New York . The Presi-dent, deeming this provision wholly insufficient forthe defense of the capital, ordered McDowell withhis corps of 33,510 men and 68 guns to remain, andcharged him with the duty of covering and defend-ing Washington .
This led to a telegraphic correspondence, thuscharacterized in the President’s letter to GeneralMcClellan , dated April 9th: “ Your dispatchescomplaining that you are not properly sustained,while they do not offend me, pain me very much.”Then, after again explaining the detachment ofBlenker and the retention of McDowell, Mr. Lin-coln concludes with these noteworthy admonitions:
“ I suppose the whole force which has gone forwardto you is with you by this time ; and if so, I thinkit is the precise time for you to strike a blow. Bydelay, the enemy will steadily gain on you — thatis, he will gain faster by fortifications and reen-forcements than you can by reinforcements alone.
“And once more, let me tell you, it is indispen-sable to you | that you strike a blow! I am power-less to help this. You will do me the justice toremember I always insisted that going down thebay in search of a field instead of fighting at ornear Manassas , was only shifting and not sur-mounting a difficulty; that we would find the sameenemy and the same or equal intrenchments ateither place. The country will not fail to note —is noting now—that the present hesitation to moveupon an intrenched enemy is but the story ofManassas repeated.
“ I beg to assure you that I have never writtenor spoken to you in greater kindness of feelingthan now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you,so far as in my most anxious judgment I consist-ently can. Bui you must act. ” 4
On the 11th of April, Franklin’s division was