3 24 soul necessarily livings

ferently; but never that it is of the being ofit, which rather imports its exijlence. Be itas it will, there can be no great mistake insaying, a property is of the estence of athing, when that thing cannot be conceivedwithout this property. Now, by N° 2, and5, above, it is contradictory that the foolshould at any time, even while united to thebody, be without the power of action, thatis, of thinking ; for reflection is action ;and thinking, or reasoning, is reflection*And by N° 7, 8 and 9, it is contradictorry that, in a state of separation, it shouldnot always be active, or exercise this poW'er. And by the reasoning in N° 7 and 1 9*it appears that it is only the indispositionof the body, that can interrupt the e%'

itself nothing; and that substance, or what be callsJlratum is but empty found. But if there is any such thiaSas qualities or properties, there must be some farth efthing to which they belong; fince a quality could > lotsubsist by itself, or without a subject. This other thi^*if we speak of it at all, must be called subject, supP° rtjsubstance, or some such name; let these men ridicule a*much as they please. For though we know not what th^substratum or support of properties is, nor have any P^ rticular idea of it; yet we know that it is, unless propercould subsist by themselves. And if there be neither/^per ties nor subject, there would be nothing lest to eX1 -